Russia's recent thundering 'return' to the Middle East is first and foremost an obvious result of the effective use of hard power, rather than the tools of soft power such as economics or diplomacy, which played important but secondary roles. The most visible symbol of this return is the establishment of two permanent sovereign Russian military bases in Syria. Indeed, Moscow has extensive experience in employing hard power to protect its interests, but political, financial and security costs and risks of its application are aplenty, which will dictate Russia's more cautious policy on this matter in the future. Having gained a military foothold in the region, Russia now seeks to augment its influence in the MENA region further, and increasingly through the use of soft power, particularly diplomatic initiatives. The Astana-Sochi process is the format that Russia has moulded for this purpose. The study seeks to provide, first, an analysis of the Astana-Sochi process for Syria, its theoretical foundations and practical implementations, evaluation of its strengths and weaknesses, and then explore its applicability in the MENA region considering both objective features of the format and more subjective implications of the wider Russian involvement in the region against the backdrop of rising tensions between Moscow and the West.