ПРАВОВЫЕ АСПЕКТЫ КАНТОВСКОГО ВЗГЛЯДА НА НЕДОПУСТИМОСТЬ ЛЖИ

Анализируется работа Канта «О мнимом праве лгать из человеколюбия». Авторы рассматривают основания, по которым сам Кант считает ложь недопустимой, и аргументируют в пользу того, что понимание этих оснований тесным образом связа- но с кантовским пониманием общественного договора.

LEGAL ASPECTS OF KANT’S VIEW ON THE PROHIBITION OF LYING

Kant’s essay “On a Supposed Right to Lie from Philanthropy” remains one of his most widely debated works, and the arguments it presents are among the most contested within his entire practical philosophy. Scholarly research on this text, which primarily unfolds on ethical grounds, tends to fall into two camps. The first group of commentators seeks to reconcile the essay’s conclusions with Kant’s broader moral philosophy, a task that often requires a particularly charitable interpretation of his arguments. The second group, in contrast, aims to show why such reconciliation is impossible, arguing that the essay’s own findings fundamentally clash with Kant’s ethical system. In our view, both approaches share a significant flaw: they largely overlook the essay’s distinct philosophical and legal context. This article offers a close examination of Kant’s own grounds for rejecting lying and proposes a specific interpretation of these grounds. This interpretation achieves two things. First, it avoids a conflict with Kant’s ethical works – a conflict that seems to us merely apparent. Second, it successfully situates the arguments within his legal writings. A key to our approach is recognizing the technical meaning of certain terms Kant uses. Accordingly, we consider concepts such as declaration (Aussage/Declaration/Erklärung) and the source of right (Rechtsquelle). Our focus here is on the latter term. We argue that the most plausible candidate for this Rechtsquelle is the social contract, a view that aligns well with Kant’s own social contract theory as developed in his political works. Finally, we address both actual and potential objections to this interpretation.