The Initial Stage of the Gorlitskaya Operation (1915). Causal Relationships of the Defeat of the Russian Army; [Начальный этап Горлицкой операции (1915 г.). Причинно-следственные связи поражения Русской армии]

The article examines the initial stage of the Gorlitskaya operation, from the point of view of identifying the common causes of the defeat of the Russian army in the first decade of May 1915 in Galicia. The authors rely on the concept of the crisis of the command of the Russian Army as a basic one in the study of Russia's participation in the First World War. Based on documents from both Russian and German archives, the authors conclude that in the spring of 1915 there was a crisis of command at various levels in Russia, the Russian high command did not understand the new methods of warfare, unlike the command of the army of Kaiser Germany. The Russian high command considered heavy artillery as a means of fighting fortresses and their defense, but not as a means of fighting at the front, unlike the Germans and Austrians, who began to widely use heavy artillery on the Eastern Front in 1915. The paper shows that the Russian command made many mistakes at the tactical and small strategic levels on the Southwestern Front, in particular, creating an incorrect defense configuration. Reserves were sent to help the Southwestern Front untimely and in insufficient numbers when the offensive of the States of the Center in Galicia began. The authors believe that the Russian army had a chance to win at the initial stage of the Gorlitskaya battle, but it was missed due to a number of strategic mistakes. At the same time, the authors believe that the military-technical superiority over Russia in 1915 was exaggerated and this issue needs clarification and elaboration. Copyright © 2024 by Cherkas Global University.