Постижение Мамардашвили Часть 2. Символ и сознание в творчестве М.К. Мамардашвили

Вскрывается специфика понимания символа как средства познания сознания в творчестве М.К. Мамардашвили. Отмечается отличие его трактовки от существующих аналогов в неокантианстве и русской метафизике Серебряного века (П.А. Флоренский, А.Ф. Лосев и др.). Символ сознания рассматривается как «пустая форма», трансценденталия, благодаря которой оказывается возможным трансцендирование, порождение человека как духовно-нравственного существа. Анализируется критика со стороны Мамардашвили натурализированной теории идей («платонизма»). Сама идея описывается как символ сознания, единица его описания. Мамардашвили предлагает мыслить идеи не трансцендентно (т.е. традиционно метафизико-теологически), а трансцендентально. С этой же точки зрения рассматривается вся история философии, - не как изучение философской эмпирики, а попытка принять участие в акте мысли. На этой основе проводится различие между философией «символической» (говорящей на языке символов) и феноменологической, трансцендентальной, - в трактовке Мамардашвили, не изучающей и не порождающей символику, а изучающей ее работу в сознании.

Comprehending Mamardashvili. Part 2. Symbol and Consciousness in M.K. Mamardashvili’s Creativity

Merab K. Mamardashvili (1930-1990) was the philosopher of Georgian descent who worked in the Soviet epoch, and whose philosophical heritage is of great significance for the modern Russian society. My second article reveals the specificity of understanding the symbol as a means of cognition of consciousness in his creativity. It demonstrates the difference between its interpretation and the analogues existing in neo-Kantianism and Russian Silver Age metaphysics (P.A. Florensky, A.F. Losev, etc). The symbol of consciousness is seen as an ‘empty shape’, something transcendental, through which becomes possible transcendence generating man as a spiritual and moral being. So in Mamardashvili’s works, symbol appears not as explanation of the universe but as a creative transcending action that builds up human being as moral creature. Mamardashvili’s criticism of the naturalized theory of ideas (‘Platonism’) is analyzed. The idea itself is seen as a symbol of consciousness, a unit of its description. Being purified by Kantian critic Mamardashvili advises to think ideas not transcendent (i.e. traditionally metaphysical-theological), but transcendental. The entire history of philosophy is considered from the same point of view, - not as studying philosophical empirical knowledge, but as an attempt to take part in the act of thinking. Mamardashvili is not interested in ‘dead knowledge’. The challenge consists in revitalizing the mental states concealed behind the texts. To him, a philosophical text is not an element of bookish knowledge, but a certain design of condensed meaning. The task is to take this meaning out of its ‘package’. In this case, philosophy turns to philosophizing, as Heidegger mentions. History of philosophy is not a study of philosophical empiricism, but trying to take part in the act of thinking recorded in the text. At this point, Mamardashvili’s point coincides with that of Heidegger, but it is not limited to that view, as he develops it further. The essence of this ‘further’ development is that Mamardashvili regards history of philosophy and philosophizing as unfolding the potentials of consciousness that are constructive in relation to man: acts of philosophizing are a condition of life or conscious beings, they are their way of life. On this basis can be established the difference between philosophy ‘symbolic’ (that speaks on the language of symbols) and phenomenological, transcendental, - in Mamardashvili’s understanding it doesn’t study, nor generating symbolism, but studying its work in the consciousness. Distinguishing between these two types of philosophizing by means of terminology, Mamardashvili defines the first one as means for describing the ‘transcendent world’, whereas the second one is defined as emerging from the ‘transcendental consciousness’. The first type is inclined to interpreting symbols as objective existence, and can be reduced to religion understood in a vulgar way, and the idealist metaphysics (‘Platonism’) or naturalistic one (materialism). The second type prohibits speaking about spiritual realities as objects: transcendental philosophy ‘refers to an object that does not exist, which is not defined in any possible way’. However, this ‘referring’ transcendence generates what is called human in man - the spiritual, the moral, the social, and the legal - and gives rise to a person as Homo sapiens.