Автоматические референции

В современной философии языка существует популярное направление, приписывающее некоторым языковым выражениям так называемые прямые референции, связывающие эти выражения с их носителями независимо от дескрипций, с помощью которых мы понимаем их значения. Частный случай такой теории - концепция автоматической референции демонстративных выражений, согласно которой эти выражения меняют своих носителей в контекстах независимо от интенций субъектов, использующих их для указания на соответствующие объекты. Но можно ли приписать прямую референцию выражению, демонстрирующему автоматизм такого рода? В данной статье предложен альтернативный анализ соответствующих феноменов, не поддерживающий концепцию прямой референции.

On automatic reference

There is an idea in modern philosophy of language that some types of linguistic expressions are directly referential, i.e. refer to their objects independently of any descriptive or conceptual background of understanding what the expression mean. Some such expressions (names) are supposed to have stable reference while another change their reference depending on the context of use (demonstratives and indexicals). One theory firmly associated with the idea of direct reference is the theory of automatic reference. It presupposes that an expression referring to its object does so independently of the communicative intention of the user, which otherwise would determine what the utterance of this expression means in the given case. But I think that the kind of automaticity some expressions actually demonstrate under certain ways of use hardly supports the very idea of direct reference, and the automaticity presumed by the theory under consideration is more like a legend than reality. In other words, an expression may be automatically tied to certain object or class by circumstances of context, including conventions shared by the agent, or even rules determining changes of meaning due to the contexts. And communicative intentions may be not directly involved in these sorts of meaning. But they contribute indirectly. E.g. what exactly context provides for the utterance depends on how much it is itself constituted by relevant beliefs of communicators. The dependence of the reference solely on the object of this reference is a pretty obscure notion, and that was shown in the paper by several examples: the ordinary use of "I", for instance, can tie it firmly to the agent of the context, but not to any definite person, since which person it is, is determined commonly by certain kind of knowledge or concept, or belief, i.e. something convertible into the intention of utterance. In general, any term may be used in a way which makes it automatically referring to something, but this does not make any such use automatically fulfilled in any relevant context by picking up some certain object, and only it, just because there are no types of objects out there ready for such picking up.